A nondestructive technique utilizing precision gamma-ray scanning has been developed for detecting fuel cladding failure in doubly encapsulated fast reactor fuel elements. Detection of fission products, in particular i^cg^ outside the fuel pin envelope was used to indicate the failure. The method was tested by examining eleven mixed uranium-plutonium carbide and two mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel elements. Gammaray scanning indicated that six of the thirteen fuel elements had failed. These results were confirmed by mass spectrometric analysis of tne gases in the outer encapsulation which were found to contain 11. 7 to 65. 0% xenon and 1,76 to 9, 31% krypton. The cover gas from a seventh pin contained only 0 o 016% xenon and < 0. 003% krypton, and the presence of ll37 Cs outside the cladding was not conclusively detected by gamma-ray scanning. Cesium-137 was not found in the outer encapsulation of the six other fuel elements by gamma-ray scanning, and mass spectrometric analyses confirmed that the cladding had not failed.
Various diagnostic techniques including neutron and x-ray radiography as well as eddy current testing have been studied In attempts to detect failures in the pin cladding. Massive failure in fuel pins has been detected with neutron and betatron radiography. Although radiographic images can be improved by computer and photographic enhancement techniques, radiography probably cannot be made sufficiently sensitive to reveal small breaches in the cladding. As precision gammaray scanning determines distributions of individual isotopes at accurately measured locations along the length of the fuel elements, this technique was promising for detecting volatile fission products or gas tracers escaping from the inner encapsulation into the outer capsule. Preliminary tests showed 137 that detection of Cs outside the fuel pin envelope reliably indicated breaching of a fuel pin and was a more sensitive test than measurement of Kr. Efforts to locate other fission products cutside the fuel pin or to consider the addition of a tracer gas were suspended at this time, and the 137 reliability of the detection of Cs as positive identification of breached pins was tested.
Theory
Fission products may escape from the fuel envelope to the coolant in the outer encapsulation either through minor cladding failures that permit the escape of gaseous and volatile fission products, or major cladding failures which permit the coolant to wash-out some of the non-volatile fission (2) products.
The gaseous and volatile fission products would move from the coolant into the gas plenum. The distribution of these fission products between the cover gar and the coolant would be dependent upon the distribution coefficients of the individual elements, the escape and re-entry probabilities, and the area of the interface. Once the nuclides were in the cover gas, they may remain in the gas, as do the isotopes of xenon and krypton, or they may adsorb onto an acceptable surface as 137 does
Cs. The adsorption of fission products onto a surface is proportional to the numbers of unsaturated sites available and the probability of adsorption and release for the particular isotopes. The non-volan'e fission products would remain in the coolant until they adsorbed on structural material of the fuel element or precipiated, generally at the coolest locations.
To be suitable as a monitor to detect fuel cladding failure, a fission product must have certain physical and chemical characteristics. It should be gaseous or highly volatile at the temperature encountered during irradiation to facilitate the movement through minor (pinhole) failures as weil as gross cladding failures. It should also have a sufficiently long half-life to allow time for examination, an easily resolved gamma-ray spectrum, and a reasonably high fission yield. These four 13' 7 characteristics are exhibited by 'Cs. Its relatively long half-life of 30 years assures adequate gamii._ activity after extended periods of cooling, and it decays 93. 5% of the time with a 661. 6 KeV gam-(3) ma photon which is in an energy region of the gamma-ray spectrum that is not complicated by other gamma rays from the irradiated fuels. A typical gamma spectrum of irradiated fuel taken with the anticoincidence Ce(Li) system used in these examinations ( Figure 1) shows that the nearest sig- Nb which cause no interference as the gamma-scanning system has a resolution of 2,7
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KeV. The fission yields for Cs is 6. 0% from 137 uranium and 6. 5% from plutonium. The
Cs isotope readily condenses on colder parts of the capsule structural material, thereby concentrating the gamma activity to make detection easier.
Use of the gaseous fission product Kr also was considered because it was chemically inert, but its fission yields were too low, 1. 3% from DC uranium and 0. 54% from plutonium. The Kr isotope emits a 514 KeV gamma ray 0. 41% of the (3) time.
This particular region of the gamma spectrum has appreciable interference from annihilation gamma rays (511 KeV). Some method of con-85 centrating the Kr, such as freezing, would be necessary if this isotope were used as a monitor. Method
The irradiated fuel element is positioned in the mechanical scanner in front of a set of precision gamma-ray collimators that defines the volume of the fuel element from which the unattenuated gamma rays may interact with the detector. The scanner has five Jegrees of freedom to allow scanning any type of sample; X, Y, Z, rotation, and tilt. The collimated gamma rays Interact with an anticoincidence detector assembly consisting of Table I .
The method appears to be equally applicable to helium-bonded or sodium-bonded fuel elements. 
